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Abstract
Emulating consumer price inflation with an increasing path of consumption
taxes when the nominal interest rate binds and monetary policy becomes in-
effective, as proposed by Correia et al. [1] in the Standard New Keynesian
model, may not neutralize a liquidity trap of very long duration. Instead this
paper presents a wealth redistributive tax policy, in an OLG model with credit
constraints, able to prevent or counteract a liquidity trap caused by a credit
shock. The tax prescription is opposite to the one proposed by Correia et al.
[1]
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1 Introduction
Short term monetary policy is ineffective to counteract a recession when inflation
is low and the zero bound for nominal interest rates prevents the real rate to reach a
negative natural rate of interest1. Standard fiscal policy prescriptions to circumvent
a liquidity trap2 usually depend on increasing public spending to stimulate demand.
Recently, however, Correia et al. [1] proposed an alternative approach based on the
use of distortionary taxes, with ”no need to use inefficient policies such as wasteful
public spending or future commitments to low interest rates”. To allow a first-
best allocation when the zero bound is binding their fiscal prescription consists on
emulating consumer price inflation, the ones that matter for intertemporal decisions,
via an increasing path of consumption taxes. They use a standard single agent New
Keynesian model where a slump is by construction not permanent.
This paper also inspects how tax policy may circumvent a liquidity trap, but when
a recession may become permanent, in an economy where credit is constrained, as
well as public spending and debt. The economic framework used in this paper is
based on the recent Secular Stagnation work of Eggertsson and Mehrotra [3]. A
distortionary tax extension is coupled to a general version of their three periods
OLG model where the natural rate of interest can be persistently negative. In con-
trast with an inflation emulation tax policy type as proposed by Correia et al. [1],
which increases gross consumption prices by increasing consumption taxes to allow
an implementable first-best allocation, the proposed tax policy prescription to neu-
tralize a permanent slump in a credit constrained environment is based on a wealth
redistributive mechanism from an unconstrained middle age generation, to younger
credit constrained households and to the old that dissave to consume: An increase
of labor taxes on the working middle generation would reduce their net income, and
thus consumption and savings, leading to an increase of the natural rate of interest
1The natural rate of interest has been defined in the literature as the equilibrium full-employment
real interest rate.
2Besides other non-fiscal approaches, namely the one proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford [4]
where the central bank commits to keep interest rates at a lower level even after a recession resulting
from a liquidity trap is over.
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to a higher stable level3. The proceeds from this tax increase on the unconstrained
agents are used to reduce the consumption tax, such that the credit constrained
younger households, as well as the old, would be able to consume more.
Curiously, although this paper and the one of Correia et al. [1] both propose to
circumvent the potential damages of a liquidity trap with no need to increase public
spending, but by using tax policy to ensure that first best full-employment solutions
are implementable, their prescriptions are reversed. Correia et al. [1] propose to
neutralize the effects of the zero bound by generating inflation in consumer prices,
the ones that matter for intertemporal decisions, with an increasing path of con-
sumption taxes during the slump. Simultaneously labor taxes are reduced such that
producer price inflation remains at the zero level. Their results hold in a standard
single agent New Keynesian framework without credit constraints, where reces-
sions are by construction temporary, but do not seem to hold in an OLG framework
with credit constrained an unconstrained agents, where a permanent slump is pos-
sible.
In fact, a policy that neutralizes a persistent recession must have an also persistent
impact in time, and thus cannot rely on a permanent increasing path of consump-
tion taxes in order to permanently sustain the natural rate of interest in a set of first
best full employment implementable solutions. A sustained increase of the natu-
ral rate of interest can instead be implemented with a contraction of loan supply
by increasing labor income taxation on unconstrained middle generation; the tax
redistribution in the benefit of the young constrained households and the old who
dissave to consume is done via reducing consumption taxes. This redistributive tax
policy could also be implemented with lump-sum taxes and transfers, from middle
age to young and old agents. Lump-sum taxation is then effective in this heteroge-
neous agents environment with borrowing constraints, but not in a standard single
agent New Keynesian framework.
With respect to recent economic literature, this paper explores the benefits of
3assuming a standard context where the derivative of excess savings with respect to the real
interest rate is positive. Excess savings being defined as the difference between supply and demand
for loans.
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a redistributive tax policy at the zero bound to counteract persistent recessions in
a credit constrained economy with heterogeneous agents, and with no need to in-
crease public spending and debt. Moreover, this paper can also be read as a tax
extension of the Secular Stagnation work of Eggertsson and Mehrotra [3], or as a
complement for credit constrained economies of the Unconventional Fiscal Policy
paper of Correia et al. [1].
Going forward, section 2 describes a three period OLG model with credit con-
straints, nominal prices and downward rigid wages, where households pay taxes on
labor income, consumption and capital income4, and firms pay taxes on hired labor.
Section 3 analyzes and compares two alternative tax policies to avoid a credit shock
zero bound recession. The first one being the Unconventional Tax Policy at the Zero
Bound by Correia et al. [1], and the second one a redistributive fiscal policy based
on an opposite tax prescription. It is shown that the first one cannot neutralize a
slump in a credit constrained heterogeneous agents environment. Section 4 shows
that the redistributive tax policy is also effective in ensuring the transition from a
permanent recession to a full-employment steady state. Reminding the Paradox
of Toil[2], an aggregate supply contraction caused by an increase of labor taxes
on firms when wages are rigid, would boost inflation and force a transition from
a stable deflation recession to a positive inflation full-employment steady state. A
capital income tax is introduced later in the paper.
2 A Simple OLG Model with Distortionary Taxes
This section describes a general version with distortionary taxes of the 3 periods
overlapping generations model proposed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra [3], where
households interact with firms and a Government, real interest rates can be persis-
tently negative and recessions long lasting.
(i) Households
Households go through three stages of life, young, middle aged and old, and use
4In appendix.
4
their income net of taxes, borrow and save, to maximize an objective function of
consumption given by:
max
Cyt ,Cmt+1C
o
t+2
Et{U(Cyt )+βU(Cmt+1)+β 2U(Cot+2)} (1)
s.t. Pt(1+ τct )C
y
t = PtB
y
t (2)
Pt+1(1+ τct+1)C
m
t+1 = Zt+1+Wt+1Lt+1(1− τ lt+1)− (1+ it)PtByt +Pt+1Bmt+1 (3)
Pt+2(1+ τct+2)C
o
t+2 =−(1+ it+1)Pt+1Bmt+1 (4)
(1+ it)PtB
y
t 6 Pt+1Dt , an exogenous borrowing limit. (5)
The young generation borrows PtB
y
t from middle-aged to consume. Middle-aged
save−PtBmt by lending to the young and to the government, and pay back their loans
to the previous generation. The old receive back with interest it what they have lent
to the young and the Government when middle aged, and dissave to consume. It
is assumed that each of the three stages of life has a duration of 20 years. U(C)
is a constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution utility function expressed by
U(C) = C
1−σ
1−σ . Pt is the aggregate price level. Consumption is taxed at a rate τ
c
t .
Only the middle earn income in the form of firms profits Zt = Ptzt , and labor net
income (1− τ lt )LtWt , where nominal wages Wt = Ptwt are taxed at a rate τ lt . Lt
is labor endowment supplied inelastically by middle generation at L¯, but firms may
hire only part of it so that Lt ≤ L¯. It is also assumed that the standard Fisher equation
holds:
1+ it = (1+ rt)Πt (6)
where Πt = Pt+1Pt is the growth rate of price level. Borrowing is constrained by an
exogenous binding debt upper limit Dt faced by the young, or B
y
t =
Dt
1+rt
, so that the
amount borrowed by the young does not directly depend on any fiscal instrument
but just on the real interest rate and the borrowing constraint. Instead, consumption
of the young inversely depends on the consumption tax, and is given by:
(1+ τct )C
y
t = B
y
t =
Dt
1+ rt
(7)
So, unless an increase of consumption tax goes along with a sufficient reduction
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of equilibrium real interest rates, it would result in a contraction of consumption
of younger agents. The same could be said about the old, but in this case with no
relation with current equilibrium interest rate, since their consumption depends on
savings and real rate from previous period:
(1+ τct )C
o
t =−(1+ rt−1)Bmt−1 (8)
Consequently an increase of consumption taxation, as proposed by Correia et al.
[1], would lead in this environment to a contraction of consumption of young and
old generations In turn, unconstrained middle age consumption is determined by
the intertemporal condition given by:
1+ it =
1
β
Πt
1+ τct+1
1+ τct
Et
Uc(Cmt )
Uc(Cot+1)
⇔ 1+ rt = 1β
1+ τct+1
1+ τct
Et
Uc(Cmt )
Uc(Cot+1)
(9)
This Euler equation is similar to the one derived by Correia et al. [1], and suggests
that increasing consumption taxes could be an alternative to increasing price level in
order to sustain the equilibrium nominal interest rate above the binding zero bound,
thus ensuring that a first best full-employment equilibrium is implementable when
monetary policy becomes ineffective. Next it is shown why this is not necessarily
the case in this credit constrained economy where persistent recessions are possible.
(ii) Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive, hire labor to maximize profits on a period by
period basis, pay taxes on labor hired at a rate τwt . The firm problem is given by:
Zt = max
Lt
PtYt−WtLt(1+ τwt ) (10)
s.t. Yt = Lαt (11)
Firms’ labor demand condition is given by:
Wt =
α
1+ τwt
PtYt
Lt
=
α
1+ τwt
PtLα−1t (12)
so that Zt = (1−α)PtYt in equilibrium. A wage downward rigidity parametrized
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by γ is considered such that households will not accept working for a wage lower
than a nominal wage norm W˜ which depends on the nominal wage of the previous
period adjusted by expected inflation of current period given by the Central Bank
target inflation Π∗. The wage norm expression is given by:
W˜t = (Π∗Wt−1)γ
(
W f lext
)1−γ
, where W f lext =
α
1+ τwt
Pt L¯α−1 (13)
whereas the nominal wage will always be greater or equal than the flexible labor
full-employment nominal wage:
Wt = max{W˜t ,W f lext } (14)
If firms need to adjust the nominal wage (12) downwards, namely due to a decline
of aggregate price level or an increase of labor taxes on firms, but are constrained
by the rigidity, then labor market may clear at a level lower than full-employment
L¯. From equation (14) labor demand can be expressed by:
Lt = L¯min
{
1,
(
Πt
Π∗
1+ τwt−1
1+ τwt
) γ
1−α
(
Lt−1
L¯
)γ}
≤ L¯ (15)
Note that if labor tax on firms is constant, and inflation is lower than its target,
wages cannot adjust to its flexible value and labor demand must be lower than its
full-employment level:
Πt <Π∗
1+ τwt
1+ τwt−1
(
L¯
Lt−1
) τwt =τwt−1≤ Π∗⇒ Lt < L¯ (16)
(iii) Government
The Government budget constraint is given by:
Bgt = Gt−Tt +
1+ rt−1
1+gt−1
Bgt−1, where Tt = τ
c
t Ct +(τ
l
t + τ
w
t )wtLt (17)
Bgt is Government borrowing per middle age household, and gt = Nt/Nt−1− 1 is
7
young generation growth rate from t−1 to t. Nt is the size of the young generation
at time t, and Nt−1 the size of middle generation also at time t. Assuming that
the market of goods clears, Ct = Yt−Gt , and substituting out the wage equilibrium
condition (12), an alternative expression for the budget constraint relating the fiscal
instruments is obtained:
Gt
Yt
= 1− 1−ατ
lw
t
1+ τct
+
1
Yt
[
Bgt −
1+ rt−1
1+gt−1
Bgt−1
]
(18)
where τ lwt =
τ lt +τwt
1+τwt
is a labor tax index combining labor taxes on the working middle
generation τ lt and firms τwt .
(iv) Central Bank
Suppose that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a stan-
dard Taylor rule:
1+ it = max
{
1,(1+ i∗)
(
Πt
Π∗
)φpi}
⇒ it ≥ 0 (19)
where i∗ and Π∗ are respectively the Central Bank targets for interest rate and in-
flation, and φpi > 1 is the Taylor parameter. Note that the nominal interest rate zero
bound is binding when inflation is lower than a threshold level Πkink = Π
∗
(1+i∗)
1
φpi
≤
Π∗, so that a corresponding lower bound for the real interest rate is given by:
1+ rt =
1+ it
Πt
≥ (1+ i
∗)
1
φpi
Π∗
= 1+ rkink (20)
An implementable first-best allocation in this economy requires the natural rate of
interest5, rnt , to be greater than the threshold r
kink.
(v) Equilibria
Equilibrium in the loan market6 implies that aggregate borrowing of the young
5Defined as the real interest rate required for full-employment in unrestricted zero lower bound
conditions
6Note that equilibrium in the loan market implies that the market of goods are in equilibrium too.
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and government, Bygt = NtB
y
t +Nt−1B
g
t , equals savings of the middle age −Nt−1Bmt ,
or:
(1+gt)B
y
t +B
g
t =−Bmt (21)
An equilibrium is defined as a set of processes {Cyt ,Cmt ,Cot ,Byt ,Bmt ,Lt ,Yt ,Zt} and
prices {Pt ,Wt ,rt , it} solving (2), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (43), (17), (21).
This model is able to generate persistently negative real rates (see Eggertsson and
Mehrotra [3]).
Loan market equilibrium condition (21) is used to analyze how equilibrium real
interest rates are affected by exogenous factors, namely credit shocks or tax changes.
Equilibrium in the loan market requires that equality (21) is satisfied, where the
right-hand side is loan demand Ldt = (1+ gt)B
y
t +B
g
t , and the left is loan supply
Lst = −Bmt . Excess savings is defined as the difference between loan supply and
demand, and is zero in equilibrium. Using the the Implicit Function Theorem7 the
derivative of equilibrium real interest rate rt with respect to an exogenous parameter
x can be expressed by:
St = Lst −Ldt = 0⇒
drt
dx
=−
∂St
∂x
∂St
∂ rt
(22)
Loan demand can be expressed in terms of the borrowing limit Dt substituting out
for the borrowing of the young (7):
Ldt = B
yg
t =
Nt
Nt−1
Byt +B
g
t =
1+gt
1+ rt
Dt +B
g
t (23)
Loan demand is a decreasing function of the real interest rate, and contracts if the
Government needs to deleverage, or if a credit shock reduces the binding borrowing
limit Dt . Note also that loan demand is not directly affected by any tax instrument.
Loan supply can be derived by combining the intertemporal condition (9), con-
7Assuming excess savings is continuous and differentiable.
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sumption of the old (8), young (7), and middle age (3):
Lst =−Bmt =
(1−ατ lwt )Yt−Dt−1
1+ 1
β
1
σ
[
(1+ rt)
1+τct
1+τct+1
]1− 1σ (24)
This expression shows that an increase of labor taxation on middle generation per-
manently contracts loan supply. At full-employment, when Yt = Yf ⇔ Lt = L¯, the
slope of loan supply with respect to the real interest rate is positive if the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution EIS = 1σ is greater or equal than one. In this situation
the slope of excess savings with respect to r is positive. Otherwise, if EIS < 1, then
a sufficient condition for a positive slope of excess savings St with respect to rt is
that the ratio of government borrowing over total borrowing in the economy B
g
t
Lgt
does
not exceed 1σ (Proof
8). This is a reasonable assumption in developed economies,
given the standard estimations of EIS usually around and above 0.5 (see Havranek
et al. [6]), in particular if EIS is equal or close to 1, or if the ratio of government
debt Bg to total loan demand is low enough. It is then assume that inequality B
g
t
Ldt
< 1σ
is satisfied throughout the paper. This implies that the sign of the partial derivative
of the natural rate of interest with respect to an exogenous parameter is opposite to
the sign of the partial derivative of loans supply with respect to that same parameter:
Bgt
Ldt
<
1
σ
⇒ Srt ≡
∂St
∂ rt
> 0⇒ drt
dx
and
∂St
∂x
have opposite signs. (25)
3 Preventing a permanent recession during a credit shock
A credit shock is characterized by a reduction of the borrowing limit Dt , having
a negative impact on the natural rate of interest in two consecutive periods. drtdDt and
8Proof: ∂St∂ rt > 0⇔−Ldt >−Lst ⇔
Ldt (1−Bgt /Ldt )
1+rt
>
(
1− 1σ
) Lst
1+rt
1
1+β
1
σ
(
1
1+rt
1+τct+1
1+τct
) σ−1
σ
⇐ B
g
t
Ldt
< 1σ .
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drt+1
dDt
can directly be expressed from (25):
drt
dDt
=
1
Srt
∂St
∂Dt
=− 1
Srt
∂Ldt
∂Dt
=− 1
Srt
1+gt
1+ rt
< 0 (26)
drt+1
dDt
=
1
Srt+1
∂St+1
∂Dt
=
1
Srt+1
∂Lst+1
∂Dt
< 0 (27)
In the first period, a reduction of the binding borrowing limit Dt contracts loan de-
mand, thus lowering the real rate. And in the second period, middle age households
that have borrowed less while young can now save more, loan supply expands which
further lowers the real rate eventually below the threshold rkink, so that a first-best
full-employment allocation becomes unimplementable. An effective fiscal policy
to avoid a persistent recession and sustain full-employment during a credit shock
should then prevent the natural rate of interest to fall below the threshold rkink. Two
alternative fiscal policies are next analyzed and compared.
3.1 Generating consumer price inflation with consumption tax
In their recent paper ”Unconventional Fiscal Policy at the Zero Bound”, Correia
et al. [1] propose to neutralize the negative effects of the zero bound in a standard
single agent New Keynesian model where a slump is by construction transitory, by
generating consumer price inflation through a temporary increasing path of con-
sumption taxes such that the intertemporal condition (9) is satisfied while real rates
ought to be negative. At the same time, they propose to keep producer price infla-
tion at zero by decreasing labor taxes.
In this model where the duration of each period correspond to 20 years, a reaction
to a credit shock could depend on emulating the same type of consumer price in-
flation by a Government commitment at time t to increase consumption taxes from
τct at time t to τct+1 at time t + 1. The effects of that policy on the natural rate of
interest are next analyzed during the current period t, the next period t + 1, and in
steady state.
(i) Period 0 ≡ t − 1: The economy is at a full-employment steady state and the
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natural rate of interest rnt−1 > r
kink.
(ii) Period 1 ≡ t: A credit shock contracts the borrowing limit from Dt−1 to Dt <
Dt−1, and rnt ought to be lower than rkink. Since loan demand is not affected by
tax instruments, the decision during period t to increase consumption tax in the
next period t + 1 only affects real interest rate through loan supply at time t, and
depends on the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ as shown by the following
expressions9, derived from (22) and (24):
drt
dτct+1
=−
∂St
∂τct+1
∂St
∂ rt
=−
(σ>1?)
∂Lst
∂τct+1
/
(+)
∂St
∂ rt
(28)
where
∂Lst
∂τct+1
=
(
σ −1
σ
)Lst (1+ τct+1) 1σ [(1+ rt)(1+ τct )]−(1+
1
σ )
1+ 1
β
1
σ
[
(1+ rt)
1+τct
1+τct+1
]1− 1σ
 (29)
If σ > 1⇒ drtdτct+1 < 0 then households are rather risk averse, and an income effect
related to an expected increase of consumption taxation in the next period would
increase savings propensity in the current period to sustain future consumption.
This effect would prevail over the substitution effect resulting from the fact that
consumption in the future would become more costly having an opposite impact
on consumption and savings in current period. Thus, if σ > 1, the net effect of a
Government commitment to increase consumption taxation in the next period would
lead to a contraction of middle age consumption in current period, expanding loan
supply and oughting to drag further down the real rate in period t.
σ = 1⇒ drtdτct+1 = 0: Income and substitution effect cancel-out each-other so that
an expected change of consumption taxes during next period would have no impact
on current real interest rates.
If σ < 1⇒ drtdτct+1 > 0 the substitution effect would prevail over the income ef-
fect. Households would rather increase their consumption in the current period if
expecting an increase of consumption taxes in the future, so that loan supply would
9Note that expression (29) has the sign of σ − 1 and is equal to zero for σ = 1, since the right
parenthesis is positive.
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contract and real interest rates would rise back in period t.
(iii) Period 2 ≡ t + 1: In the following period consumption taxes increase and
labor taxes must decrease to balance Government budget10, as also suggested by
Correia et al. [1]. Then, according to the next equation, the real rate in period t +1
would fall to a level lower than before the Government commitment to increase
consumption taxes. Let’s analyze how and why:
drt+1
dτct+1
=−
∂St+1
∂τct+1
∂St+1
∂ rt+1
=−

(=0)
∂Lst+1
∂τct+1
+
(−)
∂Lst+1
∂τ lwt+1
(−)
∂τ lwt+1
∂τct+1
/
(+)
∂St+1
∂ rt+1
< 0 (30)
where
∂Lst
∂τ lwt
=
−αY ft
1+ 1
β
1
σ
[
(1+ rt)
1+τct
1+τct+1
]1− 1σ < 0 (31)
It is assumed that consumption tax adjusts only once (in this case during a 20 year
period, as it could not grow forever), such that from time t + 1 onwards it stays
constant. Since consumption taxes affect loan supply only through the intertempo-
ral condition, then when constant they have no direct partial effect on real interest
rate level, (or ∂L
s
t+1
∂τct+1
= 0), but only an indirect effect through the Government budget
constraint (18). An increase of consumption tax in t + 1 would then require a re-
duction of public debt, or a decrease of the labor taxes, assuming that government
spending is prevented to increase, which would drag down the real rate indepen-
dently of σ . In fact, a decline of public debt would contract loan demand leading
to a decline of the real interest rate. And a decrease of labor taxes would increase
middle generation net income, which in turn would increase their consumption and
savings, expand supply of loans and drag down real rate.
(iv) Steady state, at t + 1: The final natural rate of interest would be even lower
and unimplementable than the one caused by the credit shock, and previous to the
tax policy implementation decision. Note that the equilibrium equation (21) only
depends on taxes of same period, as they are assumed constant in steady state, so
10it is assumed that government spending is prevented to increase, and public debt per middle age
household remains constant (although this second assumption is not required for the results to hold).
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that consumption taxes do not affect real rates in steady state. Since the derivative
of steady state real rate with respect to labor tax index is positive, the natural rate
of interest falls even further with the proposed reduction of labor taxes:
dr
dτ lw
=−
(−)
∂Ls
∂τ lw
/
(+)
∂S
∂ r
> 0, where
∂Ls
∂τ lw
=
−αY f
1+ 1
β
1
σ
(1+ r)1−
1
σ
< 0 (32)
So, the Unconventional Fiscal Policy at the Zero Bound proposed by Correia et al.
[1] to neutralize the negative effect of a liquidity trap is not effective in this econ-
omy, with credit constraints and heterogeneous households. First, because the real
rate can become persistently negative so that no policy depending on an increasing
(or decreasing ) path of taxes would be sustainable. And second, because the re-
quired decrease of labor taxes when consumption taxes are increased would reduce
even further steady state real rate, as consumption taxes are constant. Moreover, by
increasing consumption taxation this tax policy would penalize consumption of the
credit constrained households as well as the old who dissave to consume in favor of
the unconstrained middle generation.
3.2 Taxing the unconstrained, and relieving the constrained
To sustain a first-best allocation during a credit shock, the tax prescription next
analyzed is opposite to the previous one in terms of signs of tax changes. It is
based on increasing labor taxes on unconstrained middle generation or firms, and
redistribute the proceeds among all households via a consumption tax reduction.
Labor and consumption taxes change in period t, and are expected to remain con-
stant thereafter. So that the intertemporal condition is independent of consumption
taxes, and equilibrium in the loan market given by (21) only depends on current
period taxes. Then, without loss of generality, a log utility of consumption (σ = 1)
is assumed going forward so that previous algebraic expressions are simplified, and
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the natural rate of interest gets a closed-form expression given by:
1+ rnt =
(1+gt)Dt
β
1+β
[
(1−ατ lwt )Y ft −Dt−1
]
−Bgt
(33)
The natural rate of interest declines with the contraction of aggregate borrowing,
either because public debt Bgt is reduced, or credit constraints are worsen by a lower
binding borrowing limit Dt . But a sufficient contraction of loan supply through an
increase of labor taxes τ lwt can neutralize the negative impact of a credit shock on rnt .
The required increase of the labor index τ lwt to offset the negative impact of a credit
shock on rnt , respectively caused by a contraction of public or private borrowing
11,
is given by the following equations:
∂τ lwt ≥−
1
α
(
1+β
β
)
∂Bgt
Y ft
(34)
∂τ lw ≥− 1
α
[
1+
(
1+β
β
)
1+g
1+ rn
]
∂D
Y f
(35)
Equilibrium in the market of goods12 requires that aggregate demand Yt is the sum
of aggregate consumption Ct and Government spending Gt per middle age house-
hold. If the government is prevented to spend more than an exogenous upper limit
G, then consumption Ct cannot be lower than C f =Y f −G at full-employment. By
combining the budget constraints of the young (7) and the old (8), the Euler equa-
tion (9), and loan market equilibrium (23), aggregate consumption is expressed by:
Nt−1Ct = NtC
y
t +Nt−1Cmt +Nt−2C
o
t ⇔ (36)
Ct =
1
1+ τct
{[(
1+β
β
)
1+gt
1+ rt
Dt +Dt−1
]
+
[
Bgt
β
+
1+ rt−1
1+gt−1
Bgt−1
]}
(37)
In this credit constrained economy consumption is unsurprisingly a function of the
public and private credit limits, respectively D and Bg. In fact, if households’ credit
limit is reduced, then the young generation has to lower consumption if everything
11The private borrowing inequality uses the steady state version of the natural rate of interest (33),
since the transition effect of a households credit limit contraction lasts for two consecutive periods.
12No capital in the model.
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else remains unchanged. The middle generation lowers lending and thus saves less,
assuming the Government is also prevented to increase public debt. Then the old
would also need to reduce consumption in the following period since their savings
were reduced. Moreover, for the intertemporal condition to hold when real interest
rate is kept unchanged, middle age consumption would also be reduced in current
period. This would lead to a contraction of aggregate consumption and demand13.
A sufficient reduction of consumption tax τct can offset the negative effect on
aggregate consumption and demand of a contraction of the credit limit D, when the
real rate remains unchanged and government spending and debt cannot increase.
So that the constrained young would increase consumption, as well as the old who
dissave to consume, and thus the middle generation via the intertemporal condition.
The Government budget constraint is satisfied if the increase of labor taxes τ lwt
required to sustain the real rate at the level prior to the credit shock is combined
with a decrease of consumption taxes τct required to sustain full employment14, or
Ct =C
f
t , for which steady state expressions are given by:
∂τc =
[
1
β
+
1+ rs
1+g
]
∂Bg
Y f −G (38)
∂τc =
[
1+
(
1+β
β
)
1+g
1+ r
]
∂D
Y f −G (39)
In this credit constrained environment, a redistributive policy based on taxing the
unconstrained to relieve the constrained is effective in sustaining full-employment.
Curiously, this tax prescription is opposite to the Unconventional Fiscal Policy at
the Zero Bound proposed by Correia et al. [1].
4 Transition from a zero bound recession to full-employment
The same redistributive fiscal prescription described previously is also effective
at transitioning out of a persistent zero bound recession. Making reference to the
13We have assumed that Government is prevented to increase public spending Gt
14Note that equilibrium in the loan market (Lst −Ldt = 0), implies equilibrium in the goods market
(Yt =Ct +Gt).
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Secular Stagnation paper of Eggertsson and Mehrotra [3], a full employment equi-
librium may coexist with a stable recession in the set of implementable alloca-
tions of this model, with a graphical representation of aggregate demand and supply
curves in Figure 1. Aggregate demand is expressed by:
Πt >Πkink: Y dt =
1
1+ τct
[
(1+β )(1+gt)Dt
β
Πφpikink
Πφpi−1t
+Dt−1
]
+Gt (40)
Πt ≤Πkink: Y dt =
1
1+ τct
[
(1+β )(1+gt)Dt
β
Πt +Dt−1
]
+Gt (41)
where Πkink ≡ Π∗
(1+i∗)
1
φpi
≤ Π∗, and Y kink ≡ Y (Πkink) is aggregate demand upper
bound, Y dt < Y
kink. If the natural rate of interest is implementable (rnt ≥ rkink), then
a full-employment first-best allocation is also implementable (Y ft ≤Y kink) although
not ensured. Moreover, if inflation is greater than Πkink then aggregate demand
Y dt is a negative function of inflation and is affected by monetary policy. Other-
wise aggregate demand is a positive function of inflation, and a negative function
of real interest rate which is now greater than rkink and the natural rate of interest.
Furthermore, the lower segment of aggregate demand is not affected by monetary
policy.
Aggregate supply is, in turn, given by:
Yt = min
{
Y f ,Y f
(
Πt
Π∗
1+ τwt−1
1+ τwt
)γ α1−α (Yt−1
Y f
)γ}
(42)
For algebraic simplicity it is assumed going forward that Π∗ = 1 and i∗ = 0 so that
Πkink = 1 and rkink = 0.
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4.1 Eliminating a steady state recession
Steady state expression of aggregate supply (42) given by the following expres-
sion does not depend on any fiscal instrument, assuming labor taxes are constant.
Y = Y f min
{
1,Π
γ
1−γ
α
1−α
}
(43)
Then the remotion of a secular stagnation steady state from the set of implementable
allocations depends on sufficiently expanding aggregate demand, to trigger a sus-
tainable transition from deflation to a positive inflation level. Graphically this would
require that the intersection of the lower segment of aggregate demand moves from
a positive to a negative inflation level (see Figure 1) to clear its intersection with
the lower segment of aggregate supply. Achieving such an expansion of aggregate
demand can be ensured by sufficiently reducing consumption tax15:
∂τc ≤ (1+ τcss)
(Yss−G
Y f −G
)Πss+ β(1+β )(1+g)
1+ β(1+β )(1+g)
−1
< 0 (44)
where Yss and Πss are respectively the steady state recession levels of output and
inflation. This would require that the natural rate of interest is implementable, rn ≥
rkink = 0, where it has been assumed thatΠ∗= 1+ i∗= 1. In fact, the lower segment
of aggregate demand (41) intersects full employment at an inflation levelΠd, ft equal
to the inverse of the gross natural rate of interest (1+ rnt )
−1, so that a necessary
condition for an implementable steady state equilibrium is a negative natural rate of
interest, or Yt < Y f ⇒ rnt < 0, which is equivalent to state that rnt > 0 is a sufficient
condition for full-employment.
But the decision to decrease consumption taxes during a recession may be diffi-
cult for a Government prevented to increase public debt. Then, to generate inflation,
a contraction of aggregate supply could be an alternative to expanding aggregate de-
mand.
15As intuitively shown by expression (41).
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Figure 1: One period aggregate supply contraction shock
4.2 Supply contraction, and the Paradox of Toil[2]
In this economy where wages are downwardly rigid, deflation is a characteris-
tic of a permanent recession since firms are prevented to fully decrease nominal
wages, and thus need to adjust down labor demand. Then any effective policy in
counteracting a recession needs to generate sufficient inflation, as is the case of an
expansion of aggregate demand previously proposed, and a contraction of aggregate
supply next analyzed.
However, and assuming that steady state taxes are constant, aggregate supply
in steady state, given by expression (43), is unaffected by any tax instrument.
Moreover, a stable recession may coexist with full-employment in the set of im-
plementable allocations, so that the transition of this economy from the first to the
second would at least require a temporary cancellation of the liquidity trap. This
can be accomplished by a temporary contraction of aggregate supply through an
increasing path of labor tax on firms as shown by expression (42). Although not
sustainable in the long run, if this policy can generate sufficient inflation to tem-
porarily offset the recession then the economy could move to full-employment.
Moreover this transition could become permanent if the proposed increase of labor
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tax on firms goes along with a reduction of consumption tax to fulfill Government
budget constraint, which would also expand aggregate demand and possibly remove
the steady state recession from the set of implementable allocations (see previous
subsection).
Algebraically and graphically this can be explained as follows: A stable recession
requires a negative natural rate of interest16. From Figure (1) this implies that short
term aggregate supply (42) intercepts full employment at an inflation level Πs, ft
lower than the inflation level corresponding to aggregate demand determined at full
employment Πd, ft , by construction equal to 11+rnt :
Πs, ft =
(
1+ τwt
1+ τwt−1
)(
Y f
Yt−1
) 1−α
α τwt =τwt−1
=
(
Y f
Yt−1
) 1−α
α
<Πd, ft =
1
1+ rnt
(45)
Then the transition from a recession to full-employment can be implemented by
increasing labor tax on firms such that Πs, ft becomes greater than Π
d, f
t , or from
equation (45):
∂τw ≥ (1+ τwss)
[
1
1+ rnss
(
Yss
Y f
) 1−α
α
−1
]
> 0 (46)
Increasing labor tax on firms τwt has also a positive effect on the natural rate of
interest if labor tax on households τ lt is kept unchanged, so that the steady state
recession can altogether be cleared. The Government budget constraint would re-
quire that consumption taxes are lowered as output approached full-employment, if
government spending and debt are kept unchanged. Alternatively, the natural rate
of interest could remain constant by combining increasing labor tax on firms with a
reduction of labor tax on middle generation, so that budget balance would require a
smaller decline of consumption tax.
Similarly to Correia et al. [1] a liquidity trap is resolved with an inflation boost,
although with an opposite prescription in this credit constrained environment through
16and that for negative inflation levels, the slope of aggregate demand is positive and steeper than
the slope of aggregate supply (see also Eggertsson and Mehrotra [3])
20
an increasing path of labor tax on firms combined with a reduction of consumption
tax. Note also that the transition from a liquidity trap to full-employment is clearly
welfare improving for all generations.
Capital income tax
Introducing capital, and a capital income tax in the model, does not qualitatively
change the fiscal policy options derived so far to counteract persistent recessions.
By having an impact similar to the consumption tax in expanding aggregate de-
mand, reducing the tax on capital can be an effective alternative to a reduction of
consumption taxes when further expanding consumption is not a desirable policy
option. The model with capital is derived in appendix.
5 Final remarks
This paper proposes a redistributive tax policy to counteract zero bound reces-
sions without the need to increase public spending or debt, in an economy where
some households are credit constrained, real interest rates can be permanently neg-
ative, and an economic slump can last for a very long time. Ensuring that a first-
best allocation is an implementable solution requires that the natural rate of interest
clearing loan market at full-employment remains positive. Namely during a credit
shock that permanently contracts the demand for loans. The proposed policy pre-
vents the real rate from falling through a contraction of loan supply via increasing
private and corporate taxes on labor. The proceeds of this labor tax increase, that
alone would negatively affect consumption of unconstrained agents, are used to re-
duce consumption tax to the benefit of all households, and thus sustain consumption
at its full-employment level. A tax policy based on annual lump-sum taxation of
unconstrained households combined with transfers to the constrained could have
equivalent results in this OLG framework, but would not be effective in reaching
the same objective in the standard single agent New Keynesian model without bor-
rowing constraints used by Correia et al. [1].
Their Unconventional Fiscal Policy at the Zero Bound is instead based on gen-
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erating inflation in consumer prices, the ones that matter for intertemporal deci-
sions, with an increasing path of consumption taxes during the transitory17 slump.
Producer price inflation is in turn kept at zero through a decreasing path of labor
income taxes. Curiously, their tax prescription is opposite to the redistributive tax
policy, and would worsen a recession in the OLG setting of this paper, as lower la-
bor taxes would reduce even further the natural rate of interest in a permanent way,
and increasing consumption tax would contract consumption further away from
full-employment level.
To conclude, the most effective tax policies to counteract a zero bound recession
without increasing public spending or debt can be based on opposite tax prescrip-
tions depending on the model chosen to best fit a given economy.
17by construction.
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A Capital Income Tax
We introduce distortionary taxes including the tax on capital income in the budget
constraints of the middle age and old, given by:
(1+ τct+1)C
m
t+1 = zt+1+wt+1Lt+1(1− τ lt+1)+Kt+1[rkt+1(1− τkt+1)−1]− (1+ rt)Byt +Bmt+1
(47)
(1+ τct+2)C
o
t+2 =−(1+ rt+1)Bmt+1+Kt+1(1−δ ) (48)
and the labor tax on firms is still considered in the firm problem, now given by:
Zt = max
Lt ,Kt
{PtYt−WtLt(1+ τwt )−Ptrkt Kt} s.t. Yt = AtLαt K1−αt (49)
where, wt = WtPt =
αLα−1t
1+τwt
= α1+τw
Yt
Lt
and rkt = (1−α)AtLαt K−αt = (1−α) YtKt . From
the return on capital expression we can directly observe that a reduction of the tax
on capital income reduces the cost of capital:
rkt =
1
1− τkt
(
1− 1−δ
1+ rt
)
(50)
Aggregate demand expands when if the tax on capital income decreases. This can
be directly observed from the following expression of aggregate demand in real
terms:
Y dt =
1
1−ατ lwt − (1−α)Blt
[
1+β
β
(1+gt)Dt
1+ rt
−Dt−1
]
(51)
Where Blt =
1
rkt
1+β
β
1−δ
rt+δ = (1− τkt )
1+β
β
1−δ
rt+δ .
Regarding aggregate supply, its expressions is equal to the one derived previously
and given by expression (43). But now full employment output is given by:
Y ft = At L¯
αK1−αt = L¯A
1
α
t
(
1−α
rkt
) 1−α
α
= L¯A
1−α
α
t
[
(1−α)(1− τkt )
1− 1−δ1+rt
] 1−α
α
(52)
The difference lies on the aggregate supply expression for positive inflation levels
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which is not constant, and expands when τk decreases, leading also to an aggregate
supply expansion when inflation is negative. Although a reduction of the tax on
capital income has an expanding impact on both aggregate supply and demand, the
impact on demand prevails. The resulting impact on inflation, employment and the
natural rate of interest are qualitatively similar to the ones derived for the consump-
tion tax, being an available adequate alternative to this instrument in counteracting
a persistent recession.
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